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  In the literature there are a number of generalizations of the Gini 
coefficient which inherit most of its appealing properties. These families allow 
the incorporation of different value judgments and all of them are more 
sensitive to transfers among the poorest individuals in society than to transfers 
among the richest. Consequently they fail to capture a fact with which 
perhaps not everybody agrees: it is always good for society to give much more 
additional income to the richest person than to the poorest one.  
  The aim of this paper is to propose extensions of these generalizations 
of the Gini coefficient with measures which, preserving their properties, 
complete the information about all the inequality perceptions.  
JEL Classification: D63 
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The Gini coefficient is without doubt the most widely used inequality index in 
applied work. This could be because its geometrical interpretation in relation with the 
Lorenz curve has a very intuitive appeal, while also having a number of desirable 
properties. Specifically, and in contrast with other inequality measures, the Gini index 
accommodates non-positive incomes easily, and inequality as measured by this 
coefficient depends on the significance of the income gaps in society. Moreover, this 
relative index implicitly defines a class of social evaluation functions that is also related 
to the Gini absolute index. However, the Gini coefficient is not additive decomposable 
into a between group and a within group term (Shorrocks 1980), or even aggregative 
(Shorrocks 1984). Further disadvantages are insensitivity (given its linear structure) to 
changes in the income distribution, and the impossibility to incorporate value 
judgements. The last of these difficulties has been overcome in a series of papers by 
Weymark (1981) and Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983). These authors propose a 
generalized Gini inequality family that allows different value judgments to be 
incorporated through a weighting function of incomes. These authors suggest a single-
parameter Gini class as the most suitable, since this class retains all of the standard 
properties of inequality measures as well as all the good properties of the original Gini 
index mentioned above. This has been known as the single-parameter Ginis, or S-Ginis, 
in the literature. 
On the other hand, it seems to be generally accepted that in order to measure 
inequality one should focus exclusively on the situation of the worst-off in society, as 
the generalized Gini inequality family does, and thus make use of measures sensitive to 
transfers among the poorest. In fact, the Atkinson (1970) family depends on an aversion 
inequality parameter that attaches more weight to lower incomes as the parameter 
increases (in the standard formulation). However, we can say that this is not the whole 
truth. Because the concern with inequality (and poverty) stems from the injustice of 
extremely low incomes, the inequality measure must be more sensitive to what happens 
to the poor. The other side of the same coin is the injustice of extremely high incomes. 
This suggests that sometimes it would be of interest to choose an inequality measure 
sensitive to such incomes in order to obtain a detailed explanation of what really 
happens. In the literature there are inequality families that contain specific measures 
sensitive to both high and low incomes, such as the Generalized Entropy family 
 
 
4(Shorrocks 1980) where a parameter indexes the part of the distribution where we want 
to focus on, or the extended Atkinson family (Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia 2008), 
which completes the Atkinson family with the consideration of the other tail. 
The aim of this paper is to propose an extension of the S-Gini inequality family 
whose members are more sensitive to transfers between rich people. Moreover, given 
the close relation between the Atkinson (1970) family and the S-Gini family as exposed 
by Yitzhaki (1983), and Araar and Duclos (2003), among others, we explore the 
connection between the Extended Atkinson family proposed by Lasso de la Vega and 
Urrutia (2008) and the Extended S-Gini family proposed in this paper.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers some background 
and motivation, in addition to introducing the notation. Section 3 summarizes the 
standard view between inequality and welfare, since the relation between both concepts 
is of clear relevance in the case of the Gini index. Section 4 makes a proposal to extend 
the S-Gini family and study their properties, while Section 5 provides some concluding 
comments. 
2.  Background, motivation and notation: The S-Gini family 
We consider a finite population consisting of n ≥ 2  individuals.  Individual  i′s 
income is denoted by  ,  i = 1,2,…,n. An income distribution is 
represented by a vector 
(0, ) y ∈= ∞ i ++  
12 ( , ,..., )
n





++ = =   ∪  represent the set 
of all finite dimensional income distributions and denote the mean and population size 
of any y ∈ D by μ(y) and n(y) (or μ and n if there is no room for confusion) 
respectively. An inequality measure is just an application from D into  , 
. 
[0, ) =∞
() : ID → y
+  
+  
The starting point of the paper and its motivation is twofold. On the one hand, two 
families of relative inequality measures are widely used in the literature. First, the 
Generalised Entropy class (Cowell and Kuga 1981a; 1981b), henceforth the GE family, 
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As is well known, the GE family includes the mean logarithmic deviation, when 
α is equal to 0, and the entropy inequality measure, when α is equal to 1 (Theil 1967). 
Moreover, the members of this family are the only additively decomposable measures in 
the sense that overall inequality can be decomposed as the sum of the between 
component and a weighted sum of the subgroup inequality levels (Shorrocks 1980). 
Second, the other prominent class of inequality measures is the Atkinson (1970) 
family given by 
1
, 0 < α ≠
=
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In the first place, it’s noteworthy that whereas the GE family is defined for all real 
values of the α parameter (i.e. it has two tails, one focusing on the “poor” and the other 
on the “rich”), the Atkinson family makes sense only for parameter values less than 1 
(that is, it has only one tail, the “poor” one). This is so because only for α < 1 is the 
inequality measure S-convex.
1
In the second place, it may be interesting to observe that, as is well-known, the 
Atkinson family is ordinally equivalent to one tail of the GE family, the one with the 
same values for the α parameter. The question of: “what happens with the other tail?” 
was answered by Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2008). These authors used the result 
from Shorrocks (1984) that any inequality measure fulfils the Aggregative Principle if 
 
1 S-convexity implies symmetry and in is the requirement that I(y) agrees with the (weak) Lorenz quasi-
ordering, or in other words, satisfies the Pigou-Dalton condition. 
 
 
6and only if it is an increasing transformation of one of the GE family, and proposed an 
extension of the Atkinson family that is ordinally equivalent to both tails of the GE 
family. Hence, for one member of the GE family we have a corresponding member of 
the extended Atkinson family and both order any distributions in exactly the same way. 












































Every member of this family meets the Aggregative Principle and is bounded 
above by 1. Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2008) characterized this new extended family 
as the only one with a multiplicative decomposition property for any partitioning of the 
population into mutually exhaustive and disjoint subgroups (see also Lasso de la Vega 
and Urrutia 2003, 2005 and Goerlich, Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia 2009). 
Our second motivation for writing this paper, on the other hand, is as follows. 
Early in the 20
th century Gini (1912) proposed an ad hoc measure of income inequality 
as a measure of the variability in any statistical distribution. He based the coefficient on 
the average of the absolute differences between all possible pairs of observations and 
defined it to be the ratio of half of that average to the mean of the distribution. The 
relation between the Gini coefficient and the Lorenz curve for the corresponding income 
distribution (Gastwirth 1972, Dorfman 1979) soon became evident, as well as the linear 
structure of the index (Mehran 1976) and the implicit weighting scheme for individual 

























7where   is a permutation of y such as  , and the second 
equality follows by using the fact that  . This formula makes explicit the 
weighting scheme behind 
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( ) I y , which involves the first n odd numbers. 
Note that defining  , we observe that  21 i ai =−
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Well known properties of the Gini coefficient are: 
G.1  Non-positive incomes are easily accommodated. 
G.2  It is bounded by zero and one for non-negative incomes. 
G.3  It has a simple geometric interpretation in terms of the Lorenz curve. 
G.4  Given its linear structure the weights depend on the rank of each individual in the 
whole distribution rather than on the specific income levels. As a consequence, 
the effect on the index of a transfer of income between two individuals depends 
only on the ranks of these individuals instead of on their income levels. 
G.5  It is possible to write the index as proportional to the covariance between income 
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 (5) 
using   and where q is the proportion of population receiving 
incomes greater than or equal to y. 
1() ii y =  
G.6  It satisfies the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, so a progressive transfer that leaves 
the rank of the individuals unchanged decreases the value of the index. 
G.7  Inequality can be decomposed by income type if the rank-order of incomes does 
not vary by source of income (Fei, Ranis and Kuo 1978). 
 
 
8If incomes are classified by different sources j = 1,…,k, so that 
 and the rank order of incomes does not 
vary by source, the Gini index satisfies an additive decomposition of the form 
1 11 ( ,..., ) ( ,..., )
n nj j yy yy = == Σ = Σ y 1
















The three main drawbacks of (4) in comparison with  ( ) Iα y  and  ( ) Iα
A y  are the 
following: 
(i)      The weights schedule in (4) is completely arbitrary and without a clear 
justification.  
(ii)   ( ) I
G y  does not incorporate alternative distributional judgements, or in other 
words, the absence of any parameter which can be varied to incorporate different ethical 
concerns and perceptions about the inequality in the income distribution. 
(iii) The fact that  ( ) I
G y  does not satisfy the Aggregative Principle, which in turn 
is a consequence of its linear and rank dependence structure. 
The first two drawbacks were solved in a series of papers by Weymark (1981), 
Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983) and, from a different perspective, by Yitzhaki 
(1983). Generalizing the structure of the Gini index, as given by (4), Donaldson and 
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 (6) 
with the restriction of non-decreasing weights starting from one, 
. There have been a number of axiomatizations of various 
subclasses of these indices in the literature (see among others, Ebert 1988, Yaari 1988 
or Bossert 1990). Clearly, 
12 i
( ) I y  is obtained from (6) for  21 ii aa i
G = =− . 
 
 
9Donaldson and Weymark (1980) proved that if the resulting index from (7) has to 
satisfy the Principle of Population, as  ( ) I






























δ − −= ⎣⎦ ∑ . The 
Gini index is a member of this family for δ = 2,  2 () () II
GG = yy . 
The members of this class fulfil all the properties mentioned above for the Gini 
index, G.1 to G.7. The covariance formula mentioned in G.5 is now slightly different, 
since it involves a function of the weights rather than the rankings themselves 
() ( 1
1
11 ( 1 ) 1















defining the function φ(δ) that represents the weight attached to y. 
But in addition, they solve two of the drawbacks mentioned above. That is, the 
arbitrariness of the weighting schedule and the inability to incorporate distributional 
value judgments. To be specific: 
G.8  The weights are determined by the properties imposed on the inequality family. 
The form of the weights is determined by imposing the Population Principle, 
whereas the restriction for the parameter value is equivalent to requiring  ( ) Iδ y  to 
be S-convex, i.e. symmetric and satisfying the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. 
G.9  Distributional value judgments are introduced by means of the parameter δ> . 
Given that incomes are ranked from the highest to the lowest, more significance is 
attached to the incomes of the poorer individuals (increasing weights) and all the 
indices in this family are more sensitive to transfers at the lower end of the 
distribution. As δ increases, 
1
G( ) Iδ y  becomes more sensitive to transfers at the 
lower end than at the upper end and the middle part of the distribution. For    1 δ=
 
 
10we have a totally insensitive measure,  ( ) 0 Iδ
G = y , so we can say that we are not 
concerned at all with the distribution of income. On the other side the limiting 
case is as  , giving  δ→∞ ()
1 min { }
1
G ii i n y
I
=




y , which only takes into 
account the situation of the poorest individual in society, so for very high values 
of δ only transfers to the very lowest income group matters. 
Hence, all of the Gini’s useful properties are inherited by the S-Gini which also 
introduces distributional judgements in a parametric way. Moreover, as we shall see in 
the next section, there is a clear relation between inequality and welfare. 





























with  , where we can see a close similarity in the structure of the Atkinson 
(1970) family and the S-Gini family. The first is the distance from one of the ratio of an 
α-order mean to the arithmetic mean of the distribution, where more weight is attached 
to the lower tail of the distribution, α < 1 in (2). The second is the distance from one of 
the ratio of a weighted mean to the arithmetic mean, where again more weight is 
attached to the poor, since the lower the income the higher the weight in the index, 
. In both cases the parameter restriction assures that the inequality measure is S-
convex and for the limiting values, α = 1 and 
1 () 1 ii = Σωδ =
δ = , we get a null value of the index in 
both cases. In fact, Yitzhaki (1983, section 4) shows that the S-Gini family has most of 
the properties of the Atkinson (1970) index, even if the latter satisfies the Aggregative 
Principle but the former does not. As a consequence, the S-Gini family has one tail, the 
“poor” one. 
Given the extended Atkinson family (3), it is therefore natural to ask: “what 
happens to the other tail?”, “can we extend the S-Gini family in a similar way as to the 
Atkinson family, so that it now has two tails?” We shall answer these questions in 
section 4, but in the next section we summarize the relation between inequality and 
welfare that will play a role in the sequel. 
 
 
113.  Inequality and social evaluation functions 
An index of inequality is called ethical if it implies, and is implied by a social 
evaluation function, WD . Define the equally distributed equivalent income 
(EDE), ξ(y), corresponding to a given income distribution 
() : → y  
n
++ ∈ y   , (simply ξ if there is 
no room for confusion) as the income level that if equally distributed among the 
population would generate the same value of the W function, so society would be 
indifferent between the actual y or ξ.1, where 1 is an n-dimensional vector of ones. 
Hence the value of ξ is implicitly defined by 
(.) () WW ξ= 1y
() : → y  
 (9) 
Assuming that W is increasing along the ray of equality, then ξ can be solved 
from (10) and constitutes a particular numerical representation of W. 
Under a minimum set of assumptions on the social evaluation function, W(y) 
being continuous, symmetric, S-concave and homothetic function, there is a one-to-one 
relationship between W(y) and a relative inequality index (Blackorby and Donaldson 
1978). Following the Atkinson (1970), Kolm (1969), and Sen (1973) approach every 
relative inequality index, I(y), may be associated to a representation of a social 
evaluation function, WD , according to the following expression: 





Comparison with the formula (4) for the Gini index shows that for this index the 
























More generally, the single-series Gini family of relative inequality indices, as 
given by equation (7), implicitly define a class of social evaluation functions which are 







































() : → y  
() A =μ−ξ y
 (13) 
It is worth noting that any member of this class can be written as a linear function 
of incomes with the weights being a non-decreasing sequence of numbers. One 
argument in favour of this class is that their members are also translatable functions 
(invariant under translation), and so they can be used to derive absolute ethical 
inequality indices, A(y). Following the approaches by Kolm (1976a, 1976b), and 
Blackorby and Donaldson (1980), every absolute inequality index, A(y), may be 
associated to a representation of a social evaluation function, WD , according 
to the following expression: 
 (14) 
which is simply the difference between per capita income, μ, and the equally distributed 
equivalent income, ξ. 
A nice feature of the Gini index, which is also satisfied by the single-series and 
single-parameter Gini families, is that: 
G.10 The relative and absolute indices imply and are implied by the same class of 
ordinally-equivalent social-evaluation functions, as shown by (11), (12) and (13). 
4.  The extended single-parameter S-Gini family 
The motivations for extending the S-Gini family were set up at the end of section 
2 as a natural counterpart to the extended Atkinson (1970) family, and given the 
similarities between the Atkinson (1970) and the S-Gini families. It is, however, useful 
to look at a particular numerical example. 
 
 
13As was stressed at the beginning of the paper, the indices of the S-Gini family are 
more sensitive to transfers among the poorer than among the richer. As a consequence, 
they focus on the part of the distribution corresponding to the worst-off. The following 
example tries to direct attention towards the implications of using only measures 
attaching more weight to the lowest incomes, without taking into account the injustice 
of extremely high incomes. Consider the income distribution y = (1, 3, 5, 11, 30). 
Assume that four additional units of income have to be distributed among the 
individuals of the society, and assume that we increase the lowest income by one and 
the highest income by three, so that the new distribution is y′ = (2, 3, 5, 11, 33). 
Although increasing the lowest income reduces inequality, and increasing the highest 
income increases inequality, the magnitude of these two effects together is not at all 
clear.
2 Perhaps not everybody would agree that this sharing of the extra income has 
been undertaken in a way that reduces inequality. Nevertheless, this is the conclusion 
derived by using all the members of the S-Gini family. It is true that the income of the 
poorest person has increased, and according to these inequality measures inequality 
should, ceteris paribus, decrease. But this is not the end of the story. These measures 
fail to capture some inequality perceptions sensitive to the fact that more income is 
given to the richest person than to the poorest. In fact the reduction in inequality is 
greater the higher the value of the parameter δ, because increasing δ attaches more 
weight to poorest and less to the richest. Therefore, it might be worth extending such a 
family in order to have inequality measures that complete the information about the 
inequality comparisons. 
In the case of the Atkinson family the extension was achieved by looking at an 
ordinally equivalent transformation to the corresponding tail of the GE family (Lasso de 
la Vega and Urrutia 2008), so for the other values of the parameter defining the 
extended Atkinson family, α > 1, the corresponding inequality measures are again S-
convex. In practice this is done by inverting the complement to one in the index, as (3) 
demonstrates.  
This trick will also work in extending the S-Gini family to values of the parameter 
less than one in the sense that the corresponding inequality measures are again S-
convex. However, inversion will destroy linearity of the new indices and therefore will 
                                                 
2 Lambert and Lanza (2006) discuss this issue in more depth. 
 
 
14not preserve the nice properties of the S-Gini family we want to keep for the new tail. 
As a consequence we extend the S-Gini family for 0 < δ < 1 simply as  ( ) Iδ
G − y . 
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The relative S-Gini inequality family corresponds to the first expression, when 
, and most of the useful properties of this family are inherited by the extension 







For instance, it is straightforward to prove that all the members of this family are 
relative and that the restriction over the parameter values guarantees that the inequality 
indices fulfil the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle as the following proposition shows. 
Proposition 1: For each  ,   is an inequality measure which satisfies 
Symmetry, the Pigou-Dalton Transfers Principle, Normalization, Replication 
Invariance and  the Scale Invariance Principle. 
{1} ++ δ∈ −   () Iδ y
Proof. Since the S-Gini indices satisfy all these properties it suffices to prove that they 
hold for the members of this family for 0 < δ < 1. But the proof is trivial since  ( ) Iδ − y  
is S-convex for this range of parameter values, takes a value of zero when all individuals 
have the same income, μ, and the negation preserves the Replication and Scale 
Invariance Principles.   ■ 
Obviously non-positive incomes can be easily accommodated to measure 
inequality and the covariance formula works as before. However, even if the lower 
bound for the indices is zero the upper bound is one only when the maximum income is 
lower than twice the mean income in the distribution, which is not usually the case for 
real distributions. 
                                                 
3 It is worth mentioning that the extension for 0 < δ < 1 is mentioned in Lambert and Lanza (2006, 
footnote 11, page 274) but they neither justify nor explore the properties of these new indices. 
 
 
15The effect of a transfer between individuals depends only on the ranks of these 
individuals in the income distribution. As mentioned above, more significance is 
attached to the incomes of the poorer individuals as δ increases from 1. In contrast, as δ 
decreases from 1, more significance is attached to the incomes of the richer individuals 
and the indices in the new tail are more sensitive to transfers at the upper end of the 
distribution. In this case as  ,  0 δ→ ()
1 1 max { }
1









−  which only 
considers transfers to the richest income group. 
Regarding the social evaluation framework of section 3, the underlying social 
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The class corresponding to δ > 1 in (16) is the S-Gini social evaluation function. 
Note that any member of this class can be written as a linear function with non-
decreasing positive weights. This property implies that they are monotone (non-
decreasing) in individuals’ incomes. Therefore, the increase in inequality which results 
from increasing one person’s income, while holding other incomes constant, must be 
balanced by the increase in total income. One significant difference between the social 
evaluation function of the two tails is that the members of the new extension, the class 
corresponding to 0 < δ < 1, are not monotone. In this case, the inequality resulting from 
the increase in one person’s income may surpass the effect of the increase in total 
income, so social evaluation becomes negative. As we will show later, by no means do 
we think that this is a drawback of the new family, since it tells us that more income is 
preferred only if inequality is not extremely high (in particular when   for 
0 < δ < 1). Thus, any increase in income that does not reduce inequality by a sufficiently 
high amount implies a reduction in the social valuation. Nevertheless, all the members 
in the extended S-Gini family are increasing along rays (homogeneous of degree one). 




16Another interesting property shared by all the members of the extended S-Gini 
family of social evaluation functions (16) is that they are not only homothetic but also 
translatable, and consequently (as already mentioned in section 3) they may be used to 
derive not only relative but also absolute inequality indices. Hence, using (14) the 
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Therefore, the relative and absolute S-Gini indices of the new tail, the second expression 
of (15) and (15′), imply and are implied by the same class of ordinally equivalent social 
welfare functions, the second expression of (16). 
In addition, another interesting feature of the absolute S-Gini family defined in 
(15′) is that they all fulfil the unit-consistency axiom proposed by Zheng (2005, 2007). 
This appealing principle requires that the inequality rankings, rather than the inequality 
levels, not be affected by the units in which incomes are measured. Obviously any 
relative index is unit-consistent but not many absolute indices satisfy this axiom. To 
verify that unit-consistency is satisfied by the members of (15′) it is enough to note that 
() ( ) AA δδ λ= λ yy , for λ > 0, and consequently the inequality ranking of two given 
distributions (as measured by any of these absolute indices) does not change when the 
units in which income is measured vary. 
Up to now we have only shown that most of the properties of the S-Gini family 
are also fulfilled by this extended family. It is therefore natural to ask: “what is actually 
the contribution of the new tail?” As we have just mentioned, our aim is to propose 
measures that are able to capture that perhaps not everybody agrees with the fact that 
giving much more additional income to the richest person than to the poorest one is 
always good for society. Going back to our example at the beginning of this section, 
Figure 1 displays the extended S-Gini indices for a range of values of the parameter δ 




As is shown in Figure 1, all the relative S-Gini indices (the right hand side of the 
graph) establish that inequality decreases in going from y to y′, but regarding the 
members of the new tail in the extended family (the left hand side of the graph), 
inequality rises in going from y to y′. It is clear that in this case, the S-Gini family alone 
does not enable us to order these two distributions according to all inequality 
perceptions and that the information provided by this extended family can be completed 
using the other tail - hence the extended S-Gini family. 
The mirror image of Figure 1 is the social evaluation function (16), as depicted in 
Figure 2. For all members of the S-Gini family, which are positively linear in incomes, 
social valuation is bound to increase. However, for most of the members of the new tail 
in the extended family, in particular for δ < 0.43, the result is just the opposite and in 
this case we conclude that social valuation has decreased. It is clear that in this case the 
information provided by the S-Gini family can be completed using the new tail. 
In this sense the extended S-Gini family (15), which contains specific measures 
sensitive to both high and low incomes, may be of great interest if we are really 




5.  Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have proposed an extended version of the S-Gini family 
(Donaldson and Weymark 1980, Weymark 1981) which preserve most of its properties 
and allow consideration of more inequality perceptions. The S-Gini family, a 
generalization of the well known Gini index, introduces the inequality aversion in a 
parametric way as a method to capture the views of an ethical observer (Donaldson and 
Weymark 1980, 1983; Yitzhaki 1983). However, as is usual in the literature, this 
generalization is unable to capture the whole spectrum of attitudes sensitive to what 
happens with high incomes, especially when we have to compare growing economies. 
To some extent the paper illustrates that these incomes are also important if we are 
committed to improving the situation of the worst-off.  
Following this kind of reasoning, the paper extends the S-Gini family in a similar 
way to how the Atkinson family was previously extended (Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia 
2008). The aim is to provide a whole picture of what is really happening (maybe by 
graphical means), since the δ-parameter is a measure of the degree of relative sensitivity 
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